

Türkistan'da Yenilik Hareketleri ve İhtilaller: 1900-1924

Osman Hoca Anısına İncelemeler

Reform Movements and Revolutions in Turkistan: 1900-1924

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İctihad or Millät? Reflections on Bukhara, Kazan, and the Legacy of Russian Orientalism

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In her classic work on Bukhara, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse writes that "Reformist ideas were first introduced and clarified in the Russian empire by Tatars and for a time, Bukhara was the geographical centre for the elaboration of their thought."¹ The occasion of a Festschrift to honor Osman Hoca, a prominent reformist figure in the history of Bukhara — and father of my dear friend and colleague, Prof. Timur Kocaoğlu — offers an opportunity to reflect on the important connections that Bukhara had with Kazan and the other centers of Tatar culture over the course of the last several centuries. Perhaps the most important phenomenon linking Bukhara and Kazan is the generations of Tatar students who traveled to Bukhara to further their education. It is well known that in the pre-modern period an education meant a religious education, and Bukhara has long been considered to have been a bastion of conservative religious scholasticism. It is a curious fact, however, that many of the Tatar scholars of the late 18th-19th centuries who are best known today for their reformist views were formerly students in Bukhara themselves. It is important to understand that these scholars first expressed such views in reaction to their own first-hand experiences among the conservative community of religious scholars in Bukhara. Much of the historiography devoted to these scholars in the 20th century has focused on the contributions of these scholars to ideas of "progress" and religious reform. Of course, in many cases their contributions in this area were significant, especially when it comes to the notion of reopening the door of *ictihad*, the independent interpretation of Islamic law by jurists. But, as I will argue below, such an approach is overly narrow and can be attributed at least in part to the lasting influence of Russian colonial scholarship and early Soviet scholarship, which at first adopted the paradigm

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¹ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, trans. Quintin Hoare, *Islam and the Russian Empire. Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies 8 (Berkeley, 1988), p. 58.

of earlier Russian colonial scholarship and later modified it. One important result of this approach has been a neglect by the historiography to study the contributions of Märcani and later scholars to other areas that were arguably far more important: the formulation of a national idea, the construction of a national history, the invention of national myths, the creation of a national culture and literary language, and other phenomena that would have been studied in detail long ago for territories that did not form a part of the Muslim Turkic regions of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.

I

It is well known that there were strong commercial, religious, educational, and other cultural ties between Bukhara and the Tatar centers of the Middle Volga region through the late 19th century.² Given the many Tatar students who pursued a traditional religious education in Bukhara, one could reasonably conclude that a period of study in Bukhara was practically a requirement for any ambitious young Tatar student seeking to advance his career as a religious scholar and teacher.³ We only need consider a few of the major figures who were drawn to Bukhara such as Utız İmäni, Qursavi, and Märcani to understand the famous attraction of Bukhara for students from the Middle Volga region. Indeed, it is a major turning point in Tatar history when talented young students wishing to contribute to their society such as Qayyum Nasiri (1825-1902) or Rizaäddin Fäxräddin (1858-1936) decide, perhaps heeding the advice of Märcani, that it is not in their interest to pursue an education in Bukhara. Nevertheless, Tatar students interested in a religious education continued to travel to Bukhara down to the time of the Bolshevik Revolution.⁴ Until the Revolution disrupted such career plans graduates of the *medreses* in Bukhara were no doubt able to further their education and advance their careers as traditionalist (*qadim*) teachers and scholars, since it has been observed that the traditionalist — not reformist (*cädid*) — intellectuals and teachers continued to represent the majority of the religious class.⁵

² See Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia*, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies 27 (Berkeley, 1998), pp. 42, 54, 58, 72-79, 100, and elsewhere.

³ Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "Abdul Kayum Al-Nasyri: A Tatar Reformer of the 19th Century", *Central Asian Survey* 1:1 (1983), pp. 109-132, especially pp. 112-113.

⁴ Khalid, *The politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, p. 100.

⁵ This point is made by Allen Frank, "The Development of Regional Islamic Identity in Imperial Russia: Two Commentaries on the *Tavâreẓ-i bulğârêya* of Hüsâmaddeñ al-Muslimê", *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early*

At the same time, there were some notable examples of Tatar students in Bukhara who viewed their experiences in Bukhara quite critically and expressed a critique of traditional religious scholasticism foreshadowing the later modernist movement known as Cädidism. Since this group includes precisely those figures who later rose to prominence as reformist intellectuals such as Utiz İmāni, Qursavi, and Märçani, they are worthy of our special attention. In this regard, it would be fair to view such individuals as precursors of the reformers that emerged in the 19th century within Bukhara itself such as Ahmad Makhdum Danish (1827-1897) and, of course, later figures such as Osman Hoca (1878-1968), and others.⁶

Mirkasim Usmanov, one of the great scholars of Tatar literary and intellectual history, has written pathbreaking analyses of a number of important figures who lived in this period. Usmanov offers a nuanced and wide-ranging assessment of the contributions contained in the many works of 'Abdärrähim Utiz İmāni al-Bulğari (1754-1834), the famous poet and scholar from the village of Utiz İmān who studied in Bukhara early in his life.⁷ Usmanov, who considers Utiz İmāni to have been a transitional figure serving as the link between two distinct periods of Tatar culture,⁸ portrays him as an important early social reformer who advocated education and rejected much of what he saw of the life and professional activities of the Muslim clerics of Bukhara. He also credits Utiz İmāni with an important role in the rejection of the closure of independent theological interpretation (Arabic *ictihād*).⁹

The young Utiz İmāni made the long journey to Bukhara to pursue advanced study with his entire family. In Usmanov's view, however, there was something special about Utiz İmāni's journey: it was not the simple pursuit of a teaching certificate to further his career that drew Utiz İmāni to Bukhara, but a genuine search for deeper learning in a Muslim land not under the rule of the infidel Russian emperor. Utiz İmāni did not, however, anticipate the two major calamities that would befall him while in Bukhara: one the death of his beloved wife Xämidä, the other the shattering of his social and religious ideals. Utiz İmāni's ultimate disappointment in Bukhara

20th Centuries, ed. Michael Kemper et alia, *Islamkundliche Untersuchungen* 200 (Berlin, 1996), pp. 113-127, especially pp. 113.

⁶ Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, pp. 62-64. Khalid, *The politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, pp. 101-102 offers a stinging criticism of the traditional view in the historiography of Danish as an influential theoretical precursor of Central Asian Cädidism.

⁷ Mirkasim Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utiz İmāni äl-Bolgari: Çor, icat häm miras", *Ütkännän — kiläçäkkä* (Kazan, 1990), pp. 199-263.

⁸ Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utiz İmāni äl-Bolgari", pp. 199-200.

⁹ Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utiz İmāni äl-Bolgari", pp. 200, 234-236.

also led him to seek learning far afield of Bukhara in Samarkand, Balkh, Kabul, and Herat.¹⁰ After a long sojourn of ten years in Bukhara devoted to study as a Tatar (*nuğay*) student and later as a teacher, he left Central Asia to return to his homeland in 1795.¹¹

One of Utız İmāni's remarkable contributions during his student years was a strong critique of the religious class of Bukhara to be found in his early work *Tuhfāt ül-ğurābā' wā-lata'if ül-ğaza'*.¹² In this work comprised of several different sections, Utız İmāni has included a section consisting of four articles (*mākalā*) surveying the four categories of students in Bukhara.¹³ Briefly:

1. The first article is devoted to a description of the "Stupid Rich Youth" (*axmak bay yeget*), who despite warnings to the contrary falls under the spell of the charismatic religious teachers (*mullas*) who devote their time to running to wherever their next meal is to be offered. Because of such a lifestyle, any opportunity for real learning is wasted. When the rich student's money runs out, he too is abandoned completely by the teachers, his erstwhile "friends". In Usmanov's view, Utız İmāni's depiction of these clerics is an effort to prove how far they have strayed from the righteous path while continually invoking the name of the religion for their own personal gain.

2. The second article in this section of the work is devoted to a description of the "Smart Rich Youth" (*akıllı bay yeget*), who is not deceived by such clerics. Yet the risk in not conforming to the local system is that such a student will be denounced as a spy. In Usmanov's view, the accusation contained in this article is supported by later events in Bukhara such as the sentencing of Qursavi to death (as we will see below) and the denunciation of the friend of another Tatar student, Fäyzzanov, as a spy.

3. The third article is a description of the fate of the "Handsome Poor Youth" (*kürkām çiraylı fākıyr yeget*), who falls prey to the *mullas* and their wrongful sexual ways, which Usmanov interprets as a strong rebuke of pederasty among the clerics of Bukhara.¹⁴

4. Finally, the fourth article is a description of the "Modest, Honest Poor Fellow" (*oyatlı, namuslı ğarib*), who does not have money and is

¹⁰ Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utız İmāni äl-Bolgari", pp. 206-209.

¹¹ Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utız İmāni äl-Bolgari", p. 215.

¹² Usmanov translates this title loosely as "Gift of those Traveling Abroad and Accounts of their Suffering Shame". Since the modern Cyrillic transcription of earlier Arabic script Tatar does not distinguish between many of the original letters, ambiguities in transcription and transliteration are unavoidable. I did not have access to the works of Utız İmāni for the purposes of the present essay.

¹³ Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utız İmāni äl-Bolgari", pp. 209-215.

¹⁴ See also Khalid, *The politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, pp. 145-148, 226.

therefore unable to attract the attention of teachers or anyone else, for that matter. He does not have the money to be taken care of should he fall ill, nor does he have the money to be buried properly should he die from an untended illness. In Utız İmāni's view, the fate awaiting each one of these four categories of students is catastrophe.

Usmanov believes that Utız İmāni's authorship of such lines shortly before his departure after a ten-year period of stay in Bukhara reflects his judgement that he wasted his time there. Of course, it is difficult for us to judge how much Utız İmāni was actually able to learn from his teachers while in Bukhara or to what extent his judgement was colored by grief over the death of his wife. It is certain, however, that throughout his career Utız İmāni would continue his advocacy of knowledge and learning.¹⁵

As noted above, Usmanov also places a special emphasis on the theme of Utız İmāni's rejection of the theory of "closure of independent interpretation" (Arabic *ictihād munqarid*). To support this view, he cites a number of couplets (as was typical in this period, Utız İmāni's works are written in verse) from *Äbyat-i türki fi fazilät-i `ilm* ("Turkic Couplets on the Virtue of Knowledge") stressing the importance of worldly knowledge, as seen from the first two of the many couplets that he cites:¹⁶

When one has no knowledge (*`ilm*), skills (*hünär*) will remain absent,
Strive for knowledge, knowledge is the essence of life.

Knowledge is the treasury of secrets for a human being,
Mastery of the two worlds¹⁷ is gained through knowledge.

In another excerpt we can see his trenchant criticism of the situation in Bukhara:¹⁸

Whoever has great knowledge is a rich person,
While everyone else is like a star, he is like the moon.
Know well that perfection is not achieved through a fur coat,
If a donkey wears silk *atlas* fabric, he is still a donkey!

It appears that the excerpts Usmanov offers in his study (only several of which are cited here) condemn the clergy while advocating learning and knowledge, which is certainly a theme also addressed later in Kazan by scholars who had studied in Bukhara such as Qursavi and Märcani.

¹⁵ Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utız İmāni äl-Bolgari", pp. 232-233.

¹⁶ Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utız İmāni äl-Bolgari", p. 233.

¹⁷ In other words, "the universe".

¹⁸ Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utız İmāni äl-Bolgari", p. 235.

I have difficulty, however, seeing in these citations textual evidence supporting a theory for reopening the "closure of independent interpretation".¹⁹ In contrast to the other themes he treats in his essay, I would argue that Usmanov does not make a convincing case that destroying the concept of "closure of independent interpretation" is central to the works of Utiz İmāni. Why Usmanov even chooses to introduce this topic is a matter to which I will return below.

Another important Tatar intellectual who spent a period of time in Bukhara was 'Abdānnasir Qursavi (1776-1812).²⁰ During his four years as a student there he was considered a gifted scholar by his contemporaries for his mastery of many important texts. Şihabāddin Mārcani wrote that Qursavi could not find a place for himself among scholars and ignorant clerics who were blinded by medieval traditions and teachings. He described Qursavi's rejection of earlier authorities in favor of an analysis of scholarly sources and a search for the truth.²¹ In his *Irşād li-l-'ibād* (written in Arabic), Qursavi himself sets out the need for battling scholars who have no education:

There are people of our century and past centuries who have no knowledge (*'ilm*) yet fancy themselves scholars. If we ignore their words and mention their wrongness, it would be a strong opinion and the right course. If honor derives from ignorance and stupidity, it is better to have no connection with it and to forget them. But we dread the evil of the consequences, and being blinded by the ignorance of innovations in affairs (of the world),

¹⁹ Usmanov may well be correct in his argument, but I have based this discussion only upon the materials in Usmanov's article. In all likelihood this is an issue that requires further investigation. For an extended discussion of the question of *ictihad* see Thierry Zarcone, "Philosophie et théologie chez les djadids: La question du raisonnement indépendant (*ig'tihad*)", *Cahiers du Monde russe* 37:1-2 (1996), pp. 53-64.

²⁰ I have based much of my discussion of Qursavi on Yaxya Abdullin, *Māğrifāt nūrı açar. Tatar ictimagıy fikere tarixınnan sâxifâlär* (Kazan, 1989), pp. 59-69. See also Ya.G. Abdullin, *Tatarskaya prosvetitel'skaya misl'* (Kazan, 1976); A.N. Xayrullin, "Mesto G. Kursavi v istorii obščestvennoy misli", *Iz istorii tatarskoy obščestvennoy misli* (Kazan, 1979), pp. 72-78; Thierry Zarcone, "Philosophie et théologie chez les djadids"; Michael Kemper, "Entre Boukhara et la Moyenne-Volga: 'Abd an-Nasîr al-Qûrsâwî (1776-1812) en conflit avec les oulémas traditionalistes", *Cahiers du Monde russe* 37:1-2 (1996), pp. 41-52; and *Islam v tatarskom mire: istoriya i sovremennost'*, Panorama-Forum 12 (Kazan 1997). It is not my intention in this essay to survey the recent discussions of the legal and philosophical dimensions of the reformist views of Qursavi or Mārcani.

²¹ Abdullin, *Māğrifāt nūrı açar*, p. 61, citing the manuscript of Mārcani's *Wafiyat al-aslâf*.

and the rush to believe errors, and the disreputable teachings of the religious scholars ... who adhere to the gates of darkness. We saw the unveiling of the corruption of their teaching and the rejection of their treatises as more useful for mankind and a more praiseworthy result.²²

In the case of the doctrine of "closure of independent interpretation", there is no doubt that there is in the *Irşâd li-l-`ibâd* of Qursavi an extended discussion of *ictihad* and a clear articulation of his rejection of the traditions that had reigned heretofore.²³

In 1808 Qursavi returned to Bukhara, where he debated his views with local scholars in the presence of the Bukharan Emir Haydar himself. Rather than persuading local scholars and the emir of the validity of his arguments, however, Qursavi was sentenced instead to death for apostasy. He narrowly escaped execution by repenting and fled Bukhara to avoid further punishment. The criticisms of his views followed him back to Kazan, where he continued to face official complaints of being an infidel and of corrupting the teachings of the faith. He died a few short years later on the Hajj after he was practically driven out of Kazan.²⁴

The third individual upon whom I would like to focus is Şihabâddin Märcani (1818-1889), who had many dedicated disciples and has been the subject of more extensive scholarly attention than Utiz İmâni and Qursavi.²⁵

²² Abdullin, *Mäğrifät nuri açar*, p. 62, citing Qursavi's *Irşâd li-l-`ibâd* (Kazan, 1903), p. 2. I am most grateful to my colleague, Nuriyâ Gareeva (Galimcan Ibragimov Institute of Language and Literature, Kazan) for making a copy of this work available to me. It is sobering to note how greatly the translation offered in Abdullin's work differs from the translation of the Arabic that I offer here.

²³ *Irşâd li-l-`ibâd*, pp. 24ff., especially p. 29. It is somewhat difficult to identify the brief quotation in Abdullin, *Mäğrifät nuri açar*, p. 64, citing *Irşâd li-l-`ibâd*, pp. 29-30. See also Zarcone, "Philosophie et théologie chez les djadids"; and Michael Kemper, "Entre Boukhara et la Moyenne-Volga".

²⁴ Abdullin, *Mäğrifät nuri açar*, pp. 65-69.

²⁵ On Märcani see: M.X. Yusupov, *Şigabutdin Mardjani kak istorik* (Kazan, 1981); Ya. Abdullin, "İctimagiy-kul'tura xäräkäte", *Tatar ädäbiyatı tarixi*, ii: XIX yüz ädäbiyatı (Kazan, 1985), pp. 225-237; Abdullin, *Mäğrifät nuri açar*, pp. 69-83; Ya.G. Abdullin and Ä.N. Xäyrullin, "Kereş süz" in Şihabetdin Märcani, *Möstäfadel-äxbar fi äxvali Kazan vä Bolgar* (Kazan häm Bolgar xälläre turında faydalanılğan xäbärlär), ed. Ä.N. Xäyrullin (Kazan, 1989), pp. 5-37; Mirkasıym Gosmanov, "Märcani turında ber niçä süz", *Ütkännän — kiläçäkkä* (Kazan, 1990), p. 7-19; *Mardjani: Uçeniy, mislitel', prosvetitel'* (Kazan, 1990); Uli Schamiloglu, "The Formation of a Tatar Historical Consciousness: Şihabâddin Märcani and The Image of the Golden Horde", *Central Asian Survey* 9:2 (1990), pp. 39-49; "Formirovanie istoričeskogo soznaniya tatar: Şigabuddin Mardjani i obraz Zolotoy Ordı", *Tatarstan* 1991:10, pp. 21-29; Michael Kemper, "Şihâbaddön al-Marg«änö als

Like the two earlier scholars, he also spent a period of study in his youth in Bukhara as well as in Samarkand. Apparently Märcani was dissatisfied with his course of instruction and instead spent most of his time in libraries. While in Bukhara, he wrote a work critical of the scholasticism and ignorance of the religious class in Bukhara. He also called upon Tatar youth to refrain from pursuing a religious education in Bukhara and to study worldly (i.e., secular) subjects. Quite cleverly, he had this book distributed only upon his departure from Bukhara in order to avoid the fate that befell Qursavi. Among the other works he produced while in Bukhara was a work expressing his support for the ideas of Qursavi.²⁶

Any assessment of the contributions of Utız İmāni and Qursavi must agree with Usmanov's characterization of Utız İmāni as a bridge between two distinct periods of Tatar culture. In his advocacy of the search for knowledge, Utız İmāni may be seen as foreshadowing Qursavi's advocacy of the search for truth a generation later.²⁷ Judging by the evidence presented in Usmanov's essay, it remains to be established that Utız İmāni provided a complete theory for renouncing the "closure of independent interpretation".²⁸ His many couplets stressing the importance of knowledge are not quite the same as the fully developed and articulated theory for the rejection of an "obsolete" dogma as presented by Qursavi. As Lazzerini notes, however, even Qursavi's critique falls within a traditional Islamic framework and never bore revolutionary implications.²⁹ In the case of Märcani, there is no question that he followed in Qursavi's footsteps and advocated reopening "independent interpretation". His advocacy of secular education, including the study of the Russian language, were a more significant departure from the views held by his predecessors. Through his works and disciples, these

Religionsgelehrter", *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, ed. Michael Kemper et alia, *Islamkundliche Untersuchungen* 200 (Berlin, 1996), pp. 129-165; *Islam v tatarskom mire: istoriya i sovremennost'*; *Märcani: Tarix häm xäzerge zaman/ Mardjani: Nasledie i sovremennost'* (Kazan, 1998); and *Şihabetdin Märcani* (Älmät, 1998).

²⁶ Abdullin, *Mäğrifät nuri açar*, pp. 73-74.

²⁷ See also the comments of Edward J. Lazzerini, "Beyond Renewal: The Jadød Reponse to Pressure for Change in the Modern Age", *Muslims in Central Asia. Expression of Identity and Change*, ed. Jo-Ann Gross (Durham, 1992), pp. 151-166, especially pp. 158-159.

²⁸ Usmanov also notes disagreements between Utız İmāni and Qursavi: Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utız İmāni äl-Bolgari", pp. 240-241.

²⁹ Lazzerini, "Beyond Renewal", pp. 157-158. See also Hamid Algar, "Shaykh Zaynullah Rasulev: The Last Great Naqshbandi Shaykh of the Volga-Urals Region", *Muslims in Central Asia. Expression of Identity and Change*, ed. Jo-Ann Gross (Durham, 1992), pp. 112-133, especially p. 115 for a rejection of the notion that Qursavi is a proto-modernizer.

This essay could have ended here with the following conclusions: many Tatars studied in Bukhara; reform-minded Tatar students in Bukhara rejected the views and lifestyle of the religious class in Bukhara; and while Utiz İmāni advocated a search for knowledge, Qursavi rejected the “closure of independent interpretation” and advocated a search for “truth”, a view supported by Märcani, who also called for education in worldly (i.e., secular) subjects. To do so, however, would be to simply repeat some of the common scholarly interpretations that I wish to challenge in the remainder of my essay. First let us examine this scholarly consensus and its origins, and then proceed with an analysis of the how this consensus in the historiography has affected our understanding of the intellectual history of the second half of the 19th-beginning of the 20th century.

II

1. Freedom of *ictihad* or interpretation of religious law; individuals must make their own responses to every question, based on their own understanding of the Koran.
2. Abandonment of blind submission to the traditional authorities (*taqlid*).
3. Rejection by the *madrasas* of books of scholastic, conservative philosophy.
4. Introduction into the *madrasas* of teaching of the Koran, the Hadith and the history of Islam. Introduction into the *madrasas* of teaching of science and Russian language.
5. Return to Islamic culture and the purity of early Islam.

³⁰ Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, p. 59.

³¹ Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, pp. 59-60.

³² Carrère d'Encausse cites A. Arşaruni and K. Gabidullin, *Oçerki panislamizma i pantyurkizma v Rossii* (Moscow, 1931), p. 10; and G. Gubaydullin, "İz istorii trgovogo klassa u privoljskix tatar", *Vostokovedenie* 1 (1926), pp. 49-74. The original edition of her work was published as *Réforme et révolution chez les*

Märcani's views — which is itself attributed in Arşaruni and Gabidullin's work to 'Abdärrahman Sa'di's history of Tatar literature published five years earlier in 1926 — seems to have become a classic description of Märcani's contribution.³³ Beginning in the late 1950s-early 1960s this description or some version of it is widely cited in scholarship by Western scholars interested in reformist movements among the Muslims of the Russian Empire such as Charles Hostler,³⁴ Alexandre Bennigsen and his colleagues/co-authors,³⁵ and Serge A. Zenkovsky.³⁶ Carrère d'Encausse's description was first published in 1966. This description is repeated or cited

Musulmans de l'Empire russe (Paris, 1966). She also cites the former source in one of her excellent chapters in *Central Asia. A Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth (New York, 1967), p. 172.

³³ Cited as A. Saadi, *Istoriya tatarskoy literaturı* (Kazan, 1926), p. 67. though the actual title of the work is *Tatar ädäbiyatı tarixı*. In the reprint of this work published by the Society for Central Asian Studies (London, 1990), the summary description of Märcani's program and the reference to Saadi as the source is on p. 18.

³⁴ Charles Warren Hostler, *The Turks of Central Asia* (Westport, CT, 1993), p. 97. the revised edition of a work originally published as *Turkism and the Soviets* (New York, 1957).

³⁵ See Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelqujay, *Les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie. Le "Sultangalievisme" au Tatarstan* (Paris, 1960), pp. 37-38, citing this same program following

'Abdärrahman Sa'di, *Tatar ädäbiyatı tarixı* (Kazan, 1926), p. 67; and also citing concerning Qursavi and Märcani: Djemaleddin Validov, *Oçerki istorii obrazovannosti i literaturı voljskix tatar* (Moscow, 1923), pp. 32-33, 41-44; Salih bin Sabit 'Ubaydullin, *Märcani. Şihabäddin Märcani häzrätlärene väladätlärene yöz yıl tulu (1233-1333) münasäbätiylä näşritelde* (Kazan, 1333/1915); and Salih Gubaydullin, "Razvitie istoričeskoy literaturı u tyurko-tatarskix narodov", *Perviy Tyurkologičeskij s"ezd* (Baku, 1926), pp. 39-57. (I have corrected several errors in the citation of these works.) See also A. Bennigsen and C. Lemerrier-Quelqujay, *L'Islam en Union Soviétique* (Paris, 1968), p. 42; and Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union. A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World*, Publications of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies 11 (Chicago, 1979), p. 202 (both works cite a shortened version of this description without attribution).

³⁶ Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, MA, 1960), pp. 24-25, citing Djemaleddin Validov, *Oçerki istorii obrazovannosti i literaturı voljskix tatar* (Moscow, 1923), p. 34; A. Arşaruni and K. Gabidullin, *Oçerki panislamizma i pantyurkizma v Rossii* (Moscow, 1931), pp. 10-11; G. Ibragimov, *Tatari v revolyutsii 1905 goda* (Kazan, 1926), p. 29; and *Istoriya Tataroy ASSR*, ed. N. Vorobev, i (Kazan, 1956), p. 389. (I have corrected several errors in the citations.)

later by Hans Bräker,³⁷ Azade-Ayşe Rolich,³⁸ and one can find more recent references as well.³⁹ Only recently have any Western scholars examined Märcani's works beyond this influential characterization.⁴⁰

I would suggest here that the major historiography devoted to the question of the history of the Tatars of the Volga region in the 19th century has focused on religious reform without adequate consideration of other aspects of the contributions of these intellectuals, especially Märcani's contributions to the formation of a modern Kazan Tatar nation, to which I will return below. Why have their contributions in other spheres been overlooked or ignored? One explanation, I believe, is to be found in early Soviet views of the Muslim societies of the USSR, which had their origins in the views of Muslim societies held by the colonial administrators and scholars of the Russian Empire. Yaxya Abdullin makes the very perceptive observation that individual Soviet authors, including 'Abdärrahman Sa'di, have viewed Märcani strictly through the lens of religion at the expense of understanding his other "social" contributions.⁴¹ This should also be seen as a reason why even a great scholar such as Usmanov seeks in Utız İmāni a precursor not just of later social reformers, but of later religious reformers as well.

As just one additional example of this overriding concern with religion, I would like to cite Usmanov's discussion of the depiction of a Russian

³⁷ Hans Bräker, "Nationalitätenfrage und muslimische Reformbewegung in Russland", *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* 9 (Köln, 1970), pp. 13-14, cited in Abdullin, *Mäğrifät nuri açar*, p. 70 note.

³⁸ Azade-Ayşe Rolich, *The Volga Tatars. A Profile in National Resilience*, Studies of Nationalities in the USSR (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 50-53, where she offers a more detailed description than is usually found in the secondary literature.

³⁹ See recently Stéphane Dudoignon, "La Question scolaire à Boukhara et au Turkestan russe, du 'premier renouveau' à la soviétisation (fin du XVIIIe siècle-1937)", *Cahiers du Monde russe* 37:1-2 (1996), pp. 133-210, especially pp. 140-141; and V.F. Pustarnakov, "Prosvetitel'stvo Mardjani v kontekste klassičeskogo prosveščeniya", *Märcani: Tarix häm xäzerge zaman/ Mardjani: Nasledie i sovremennost'*, 145-151. Khalid, *The politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, pp. 101-102 refers to Qursavi and Märcani to draw an important distinction between the Cädids and the revivalist ulema, whom he rightly views as the real heirs to such reforms in the sphere of religion.

⁴⁰ See Kemper, "Şihābaddīn al-Marğānī als Religionsgelehrter", pp. 161-165, as well as my own article on Märcani cited earlier.

⁴¹ Abdullin, *Mäğrifät nuri açar*, p. 70. Modern Tatar scholarship often addresses Märcani's contributions to humanism and "progress" and occasionally refers to Märcani as a professional historian.

character in one of Utiz İmāni's works.⁴² Utiz İmāni relates a trip during which the narrator comes upon a Russian village where he meets a peasant with the name Griška Kuzma (Grigoriy Kuz'min) who receives the traveler with great warmth and hospitality. Griška, who is unhappy with his own Orthodox faith, expresses his admiration for the Islamic religion and even admits that if it were possible he would like to convert to this religion, which he considered to be superior to all other religions of the world. Usmanov writes that during the 1920s-1940s and even as late as the 1950s there was criticism of Utiz İmāni for having given such a negative portrayal of a Russian, for which reason he was accused of advocating reactionary, even "pan-Islamic" ideas.⁴³ But accusations of "Pan-Islamic" ideas are of course anachronistic for the literary works of a poet who died in 1834. They are usually associated instead with the ideas of İsmail Bey Gaspıralı (1851-1914), to whom we will return below. But why this obsession with Islam?

III

Edward Said, in his groundbreaking work *Orientalism*, raised scholarly awareness about the relationship between 18th-19th century scholarship on non-European peoples and European colonial expansion into these areas.⁴⁴ While it was a controversial approach when it was first suggested, Said's work has spawned a veritable cottage industry of scholarship studying the legacy of colonialism in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and elsewhere and can now claim dominance as a paradigm. It is difficult to find contemporary scholarship on nationalism and literature in post-colonial societies of the Third World that does not consider the arguments raised by Said or later scholars that have pursued this line of inquiry. Whereas Western scholars may now be more aware of their assumptions regarding non-Western societies, Soviet scholarship never went through this critical self-examination.⁴⁵ It is only now that the first sophisticated scholarship is being

⁴² Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utiz İmāni äl-Bolgari", pp. 222-230.

⁴³ Gosmanov, "Gabderäxim Utiz İmāni äl-Bolgari", p. 225.

⁴⁴ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1979); and more recently Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1993).

⁴⁵ For insightful comments as well as references to critiques of Said's views see "Introduction", *Russia's Orient. Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, ed. Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (Bloomington, 1997), pp. xi-xx. For additional relevant information see Dale F. Eickelman, "Introduction: The Other 'Orientalist' Crisis", *Russia's Muslim Frontiers. New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis* (Bloomington, 1993), pp. 1-15. For a sobering example of unreconstructed Russian "Orientalism" one may suggest Sergei P. Poliakov, *Everyday Islam*.

produced on the impact of Russian colonialism on the Turkic Muslim cultures of Russia and Central Asia.⁴⁶

The basic points raised by Said and elaborated since by others since is that European scholarship considered the indigenous peoples in areas into which they wished to expand backward, uncivilized, and irrational in order to justify the conquest and colonization of these territories and their inhabitants. Much of "Orientalism" — the European study of non-European societies — has been written in the service of imperial expansion:

The kind of political questions raised by Orientalism, then, are as follows: What other sorts of intellectual, aesthetic, scholarly, and cultural energies went into the making of an imperialist tradition like the Orientalist one? How did philology, lexicography, history, biology, political and economic theory, novel-writing, and lyric poetry come to the service of Orientalism's broadly imperialist view of the world?⁴⁷

It is not my task here to offer a detailed review of the views of Said (or for that matter the body of scholarship that his work has inspired), but it is worth quoting the harsh criticism that he reserves for Arabists and Islamists for their emphasis on classical religion for understanding society and contemporary affairs:

Only the Arabists and Islamists still function unrevised. For them there are still such things as *an* Islamic society, *an* Arab mind, *an* Oriental psyche. Even the ones whose specialty is the modern Islamic world anachronistically use texts like the Koran to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian society. Islam, or a seventh-century ideal of it constituted by the Orientalist, is assumed to possess the unity that eludes the more recent and important influences of colonialism, imperialism, and even ordinary politics.⁴⁸

While Western scholars specializing in the Islamic world are well aware of this critique and have debated these issues as outlined by Said for over two decades, I would suggest four points whose critical interrelationship has in my view yet to be examined adequately. The first is that Russian scholarship on Central Asia and the other territories of the Russian Empire has been a field of colonialist scholarship from its very inception. Second, the same

Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia, ed. Martha Brill Olcott, trans. Anthony Olcott (Armonk, 1992).

⁴⁶ See the essays in *Russia's Orient*; Khalid, *The politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*; and Shawn T. Lyons, "Uzbek Historical Fiction and Russian Colonialism, 1918-1936" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999).

⁴⁷ Said, *Orientalism*, p. 15.

⁴⁸ Said, *Orientalism*, p. 301.

criticisms that Said raises for "Orientalist" and especially "Arabist/Islamist" scholarship in Europe is applicable to Imperial Russian scholarship on the Muslims of Russia and Central Asia. Third, the categories established by Imperial Russian scholarship have been adopted *in toto* by early Soviet scholarship. A fourth point that I will note only in passing is that the (de)colonialized peoples — including academic works by indigenous scholars — have also internalized these "Orientalist" categories, as can often be seen by Central Asians referring to themselves as "Orientals" (Russian *mi vostochnie lyudi*, Uzbek *biz sharq odamimiz*, etc.).⁴⁹

The first two points have been treated recently and I do not believe that we have to dwell upon them at length here in order to prove them.⁵⁰ Within Russia proper, where the indigenous peoples were treated as a separate group known as *inorodtsi*, scholars advised the government on how best to assimilate these local ethnic groups. N.I. Il'minskiy (1822-1891), professor of Turkic languages in Kazan, advocated in 1850 that the school, teacher, and local language should be the main instruments of missionary activity to assimilate the Muslim Tatars; this proposal was accepted in 1870.⁵¹ In Central Asia, the collection of information was intimately connected with Russian imperial expansion into that region. General Kaufman, the first governor of the Turkistan *guberniya*, ordered the collection of information on the Turkistan *guberniya*; this work, known as the *Turkestanskiy sbornik*, is still used by researchers on Central Asia today. While General Kaufman represented one approach with his *laissez-faire* attitude towards the indigenous peoples in the hope of Christianizing and Russifying them, this policy later came under criticism.⁵² Other attitudes towards Islam among Central Asians emerged as scholars such as V.P. Nalivkin combined closely the roles of scholar and colonial advisor. When Nalivkin requested the collection of materials concerning Russia's policy towards Islam among the Kazaks, General N.I. Grodekov wrote that Russia had failed in her Kazak policy because Kazaks were expressing with increasing frequency a desire to give up their customary law and to adopt the

⁴⁹ This topic is addressed brilliantly by Shawn T. Lyons, "Uzbek Historical Fiction and Russian Colonialism, 1918-1936".

⁵⁰ See Robert Geraci, "Russian Orientalism at an Impasse: Tsarist Education Policy and the 1910 Conference on Islam", *Russia's Orient*, pp. 138-161; Daniel R. Brower, "Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan", *Russia's Orient*, pp. 115-135; and Khalid, *The politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, pp. 50-57.

⁵¹ Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars*, p. 45. See also Geraci, "Russian Orientalism at an Impasse: Tsarist Education Policy and the 1910 Conference on Islam"; and Agnès Kefeli, "Constructing and Islamic Identity: The Case of Elyshevo Village in the Nineteenth Century", *Russia's Orient*, pp. 271-291.

⁵² Carrère d'Encausse, *Central Asia*, p. 163.

Islamic *şarî'a* instead.⁵³ Carrère d'Encausse describes the conflict that had grown by 1899:

Moreover, the Russian authorities decided to make a real stand against the growing influences of the Islamic authorities. They then found out how fatal their own ignorance of Islam and of Central Asian standards had been, and they established a plan to save themselves from this dilemma. Governor General Dukhovskii sought to bring humane solutions to the various problems raised by the [1898 Andijan] revolt. He did not want to close the door to an entente between Russians and Muslims, but found himself trying to cope with two tendencies among the Russians who had been working in the area for years, and whose advice he sought. For everyone, the origin of the drama lay in the Muslim "fanaticism" exacerbated by the intellectual backwardness of the Central Asian population to whom the Russians had brought nothing. "People speak of our civilizing role in Central Asia. At this juncture our cultural influence is remarkable for its nonexistence." Yet, while on one hand the Russian educators and scholars gathered round Nalivkin in the Samarkand group preached the final abandonment of the von Kaufman policy, others like F.M. Kerenskii continued to defend the policy of noninterference.⁵⁴

Not only was there a close relationship between scholarship on Muslims in Russia and Central Asia and Russian colonial domination of these areas, it is also clear that already in the 19th century there was already an obsession with Islamic "fanaticism". Such attitudes in 1899 reflecting the close ties of scholarship with colonial administration were no different from the views expressed in 1926 reflecting the close ties of scholarship with Soviet rule. The concerns of early Soviet authors with Islam in general and "Pan-Islamism" in particular are not necessarily original products of Soviet academic thinking and scholarship of the 1920s. Although this idea requires a more complete exposition than is possible here, I would argue that such ideas of the 1920s concerning Muslims represented the direct continuation in the Soviet period of attitudes towards Islam and the Muslim inhabitants of the Russian Empire contained in the Russian colonial scholarship, just as these same attitudes continue to find their echo in the post-Soviet space at the beginning of the 21st century.

IV

In their work on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russia, Arşaruni and Gabidullin struggle to explain various movements and tendencies among

⁵³ Carrère d'Encausse, *Central Asia*, pp. 159-160.

⁵⁴ Carrère d'Encausse, *Central Asia*, pp. 170-171.

the Muslim Turks of the Russian Empire. As noted earlier, they portray Märcani as a religious reformer and nothing more.⁵⁵ In their effort to portray national movements as class struggles they write:

Let us mention first that the term "national ideology" is to us incomprehensible. Ideology is the world view of one or another social class. "Not one class, not one party does without an ideology, and the entire question rests in what its concrete contents are. Social reality without ideology is as metaphysically meaningless a concept as an ideology divorced from reality. The entire world view is a reflection of reality. ..." What is a "national" ideology? It is either a metaphysically meaningless concept divorced from reality, or the world view of some kind of social class of the present which reflects the static and dynamic elements of class struggle, or "it appears to be the reflection of reality and it exerts upon it (on reality) a reverse pressure". Among Pan-Turkists "national ideology" is nothing other than a pseudonym for class ideology.⁵⁶

Following an analysis of the views of discredited authorities such as A.Z. Validov (Togan) and M. Çokaev they write the following:

A decipherment of the concept "Turkic ideology" is given to us by a certain Kodja Oglı Osman⁵⁷ in the same organ "Yeni Turkistan" for 1927. He writes: "**National ideology does not agree with losing wealth and destroying property**, on the contrary, **it seeks to strengthen the acquisition of wealth** and to increase it as its owner. Those who write that 'our century is a century of nationalism' say at the same time that our century is a century of economics." Nationalists says Muxane: "are those peoples who worry today about their nation, i.e. think about a healthy economic policy, acquire land, abundant wheat, iron, coal, and agree to sacrifice all in order to meet their needs." "At the same time it is important to keep in mind that nationalism thought it the equivalent of a republic or democracy, i.e. with the concept of an independent government and independence."⁵⁸

The authors continue:

⁵⁵ *Oçerki panislamizma i pantyurkizma v Rossii*, p. 17.

⁵⁶ *Oçerki panislamizma i pantyurkizma v Rossii*, pp. 177-178 (boldface in the original).

⁵⁷ Kodja Oglı Osman → Kocaoğlu Osman.

⁵⁸ *Oçerki panislamizma i pantyurkizma v Rossii*, pp. 180-181 (boldface in the original), citing Kodja Oglı Osman, "Natsionalizm i bol'shevizm", *Yeni Turkestan*, number 2-3 (Constantinople, 1927).

Thus a national ideology demands first the establishment of the right to property; second, this requires the liquidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat; and third, the establishment of "democracy and a republic" (just not a monarchy, no!).⁵⁹

If it is possible to draw conclusions based upon such a narrow sampling of early (but influential!) Soviet scholarship on Islam in Russia, I would suggest that 1920s Soviet scholarship viewed social developments among the Muslim Turks of Russia through exactly the same lens as earlier Russian colonial scholarship. In good Orientalist fashion, the key analytical concept to understanding developments in the 19th century was religion or "fanaticism". There was no need to look beyond Islam or "Pan-Islamism" in order to understand or explain the works of Märcani or Gaspıralı, since concepts such as *millät* "nation" or *vatan* "homeland" were not yet widely known in the second half of the 19th century. Of course, such concepts became increasingly well known over the course of the first two decades of the 20th century and were certainly well known to early Soviet ideologists. In 1921 the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR condemned both Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism as deviations tending towards "bourgeois democratic nationalism".⁶⁰ By 1931, it appears that a new theoretical explanation that was correct from the point of view of Bolshevik ideology was required. Thus the equation "national ideology equals class ideology" came to be born. Perhaps it would be appropriate to consider this the new Soviet corollary to the Russian colonial view: "That which is not Muslim fanaticism is class ideology." Is it not the height of irony that it was this work by Arşaruni and Gabidullin from 1931 that was so profoundly influential on Alexandre Bennigsen and his generation of scholars?

At the beginning of the 21st century it is difficult to remember at times that many important aspects of the rise of national ideologies were fully appreciated by historians and social scientists only in the last two decades of the 20th century, fully half a century after the publication of Arşaruni and Gabidullin's *Oçerki panislamizma i pantyurkizma v Rossii* in 1931.⁶¹ Seventy years later it seems that an alternative narrative is required, for which I offer a brief sketch below.

⁵⁹ *Oçerki panislamizma i pantyurkizma v Rossii*, p. 181.

⁶⁰ See also Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism. From Irredentism to Cooperation* (London, 1995), p. 18.

⁶¹ See notably *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge, 1983); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (New York, 1987); and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York, 1991).

V

In the 19th century Tatar scholars who had studied in Bukhara criticized the rigid religious scholasticism and corruption they experienced in Bukhara. They advocated the need for knowledge, a theory for reopening the "closure of independent interpretation", and the introduction of secular subjects into the *medrese* curriculum. During the time Tatar students were still traveling to Bukhara to further their education, the traditional identity of the communities of Muslim Turks in the Russian Empire still followed the classic pattern of identification by locality, religion, and other pre-modern communal and socio-economic identities. The nomadic and recently sedentarized peoples continued to identify themselves by their tribal affiliation as well, a system which by the late 19th century was no longer known among Tatars of the Middle Volga region, though it was still known among the Bashkirs.⁶²

What has been missing in the traditional historiography, however, is that the 19th century was also an era of new ideas going beyond religious reform that are not reflected in early Soviet scholarship, including the idea of a territorial nation. One of the new ideas was an inclusive, overarching Muslim Turkic identity (and an even broader Muslim identity) advocated by İsmail Bey Gaspıralı (1851-1914) and articulated in a variety of publications, including the landmark newspaper *Tercüman* which he began publishing in 1884.⁶³ The concept of an overarching Muslim Turkic identity came into competition with the influential concept of a regional Tatar identity formulated roughly around the same time. This concept was developed in Kazan (not Bukhara) and articulated clearly for the first time in Tatar by

⁶² Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hâtıralar. Türkistan ve diğer müslüman doğu Türklerinin millî varlık ve kültür mücadeleleri* (Istanbul, 1969), pp 2-3. Khalid, *The politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, pp. 187-215 offers a wonderful discussion of pre-modern identities in Turkistan.

⁶³ On Gaspıralı see Edward J. Lazzerini, "İsmail Bey Gasprinskii (Gaspıralı): The Discourse of Modernism and the Russians", *Tatars of the Crimea. Their Struggle for Survival*, ed. Edward Allworth (Durham, 1988), pp. 149-169; *İsmail Bey Gasprinskii and the Fate of Turkic Culture in the Russian Empire* (Turko-Tatar Press: Madison, forthcoming); Alan W. Fisher, "İsmail Bey Gaspıralı, Model Leader for Asia", *Tatars of the Crimea. Their Struggle for Survival*, pp. 11-26; Nadir Devlet, *Rusya Türklerinin millî mücadele tarihi (1905-1917)*, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları 58 (Ankara, 1985); *İsmail Bey (Gaspıralı)*, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları 962 (Ankara, 1988); and Hakan Kırımlı, *Kırım Tatarlarında millî kimlik ve millî hareketler (1905-1916)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII, 167 (Ankara, 1996); *National Movements & National Identity Among the Crimean Tatars (1905-1916)*, The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage 7 (Leiden, 1996).

Şihabäddin Märcani in 1885⁶⁴ and further popularized by his disciples. As noted above, I have argued elsewhere that Şihabäddin Märcani, while trained as a scholar of religion, was more significantly the first historian to write a modern history of the Kazan Tatar people through which he laid the ideological foundation for a Kazan Tatar territorial nation.⁶⁵ In other words, Märcani was the first national historian of the Kazan Tatars and disciples of Märcani such as Rizaäddin Fäxräddin — while disagreeing with some contours of the national history proposed by Märcani⁶⁶ — continued the work of laying and propogating through the new national press an ideological foundation for a modern Kazan Tatar nation.⁶⁷ Other individuals such as Qayyum Nasiri made tremendous contributions to the development of a modern Tatar literary culture.⁶⁸

Through the rise of modern printing of Turkic-language newspapers in the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century (and especially following the liberalization of 1905), one could speak of a larger community of readers stretching from the Balkans in the west to Constantinople and Baku, to Kazan and Ufa in the north, Orenburg, Bukhara and Samarkand in the south, Kashgar in the east, and beyond. Perhaps we should speak of multiple “imagined communities” with competing concepts of a modern identity associated with competing individuals, newspapers, and political groups. The next few decades, however, would see the triumph of

⁶⁴ See his *Müstäfad ül-axbar fi ähval Qazan vä-Bulğar*, i-ii (Kazan, 1885-1900). I have only been able to consult the second edition of this work (1897-1900). It is difficult to recommend the modern abridged edition, *Möstäfadel-äxbar fi äxvali Kazan vä Bolgar (Kazan häm Bolgar xälläre turınnda faydalanılğan xäbärlär)*, as an adequate basis for scholarly research. I should note that I have not considered Märcani's earlier Russian-language works in this regard because I assume that it was the Tatar presentation of his views that had the greatest impact. See also Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars*, p. 65.

⁶⁵ Schamiloglu, “The Formation of a Tatar Historical Consciousness: Şihabäddin Märcani and The Image of the Golden Horde”.

⁶⁶ This is seen even in the “Tatar” versus “Türk” controversy as reflected in Fäxräddin's preference for the terms “Bulğar Turk” and “Kazan Turk”. See Rizaäddin Fäxreddinev, *Bolgar vä Kazan törekläre* (Kazan, 1993), especially pp. 20-22.

⁶⁷ The significance of this is not fully understood by Allen Frank, “The Development of Regional Islamic Identity in Imperial Russia”, pp. 113-114; and Allen J. Frank, *Islamic Historiography and 'Bulghar' Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia*, Social, Economic and Political Studies in the Middle East and Asia 61 (Leiden, 1998), pp. 9-11, who confuses various earlier forms of communal identity with the construction of a modern ideology for a territorial nation.

⁶⁸ Lemercier-Quelquejay, “Abdul Kayum Al-Nasyri: A Tatar Reformer of the 19th Century”.

the idea of a regional territorial nation (the "Märcani model") over the idea of an inclusive Turkic territorial nation among the many different groups of Muslim Turks within the Russian Empire (the "Gaspıralı model"). Even in Crimea, İsmail Bey Gaspıralı's argument for a Muslim Turkic identity was supplanted by the "Young Tatar" movement.⁶⁹ It may be said that Gaspıralı saw the defeat of his idea during his own life time, nor is it clear whether this idea may ever gain similar currency again. New ideologies for separate territorial nations in the sedentary and formerly-nomadic areas of Central Asia were still being formulated in the second decade of the 20th century.

This was also an era of great social upheaval and political transformation. By the beginning of the 20th century, many Tatars of the Middle Volga region began to go beyond an embrace of new ideas concerning educational reform and the national question to an exploration of international socialist and even revolutionary ideas.⁷⁰ Finally, strong political, territorial, and linguistics divisions between the Turkic peoples found a newer and stronger (final?) expression — though along completely new territorial and ethnic lines — in the Soviet period. While these new divisions represented a break with earlier pre-revolutionary concepts for how these new nationalities might be configured and were at odds with the historical states of the region, they form the basis of the modern republics of Central Asia today. Many Turkic peoples, especially in Siberia, had no distinct modern ideologies of their own until they were recognized as nationalities in the Soviet period.

This briefest sketch of the history of the development of competing pan-Turkic and individual regional national ideologies among various Turkic and Tatar communities as I understand it could not be further from the classic Russian — Soviet — Cold War-era Western depiction of reform movements among the Muslim Turkic societies of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. From my perspective, there are several important implications of such a view of the state of the historiography. The first is that the intellectual history of the Muslim Turks of the Russian Empire needs to

⁶⁹ Kırımlı, *Kırım Tatarlarında milli kimlik ve milli hareketler (1905-1916)*, pp. 87ff.; and

National Movements & National Identity Among the Crimean Tatars (1905-1916), pp. 73ff.

⁷⁰ See Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union*. In literature we should note the works of Gayaz İsxaki, see Gustav Burbiel, "Ghayaz İshaqi's Place in Tatar Literature", *Muhammed Ayaz İshaki. Hayatı ve faaliyeti. 100. doğum yılı dolayısıyla* (Ankara, 1979), pp. 141-149. It is only in recent years that scholarship devoted to İsxaki has begun to appear in Tatarstan itself, see Mansur Xäsənov, "Tatar renessansınıñ böek kaharmanı" in Gayaz İsxakiy, *Äsärlär, I* (Kazan, 1998), pp. 5-30.

be rewritten to go beyond religious reform as the sole topic worthy of investigation in the 19th century. There were many dimensions to the various movements of the late 19th century grounded upon other ideologies such as nationalism that would have been explored in greater detail long ago were it not for the simplistic and misleading views of Soviet scholarship of the 1920s-1930s.

Another dimension that I have not explored in this essay is the need to reconsider the multi-faceted roles of individuals who were trained and sometimes employed as religious scholars but whose contributions were also in the area of writing history, which is often to be equated in this period with writing of national history. Märçani clearly belongs to this category, but this is equally valid for Rizaäddin Fäxräddin and many others. An even more interesting case is posed by Murat Rämzi, the publication of whose impressive and detailed Arabic-language history was patronized by the well-known Naqşbandi shaykh Zaynullah Rasulev and later banned by the Russian authorities.⁷¹

This essay has attempted to trace how several elements common to Bukhara and Kazan have resulted in certain ideas concerning reform, how some ideas have been misunderstood and misrepresented, and how we need to overcome the momentum of the traditional views in the historiography that only serve as obstacles to a better understanding of the rise of various reform and national movements among the Muslim Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire and beyond. One question that requires further study is whether any of the historical works written in the Ottoman Empire, the Caucasus, or Central Asia in the 19th century consciously advocated a modern territorial nation for any specific Turkic group. As far as I know, there were no such works in the Caucasus and Central Asia.⁷² In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the complicated phenomenon of "Ottomanism", which

⁷¹ M.M. Ramzî, *Talfîq al-axbâr wa-talqîh al-âtâr fî waqâ'i Qâzân wa-Bulgâr wa-mulûk at-Tatâr*, i-ii (Orenburg, 1908). See the comments of Algar, "Shaykh Zaynullah Rasulev", p. 125-126.

⁷² It is difficult to consider an earlier work such as the history of Shirvan and Dagistan completed in Persian in 1841 by Abbasqulı Ağa Baqıxan (1794-1846) and translated into Russian in 1844 as a work that defines an Azerbaijani nation in the modern sense. See Abbas-kuli-aga Bakıxanov, ed. Z.M. Bunyatov, *Gyulistan-i Iram* (Baku, 1991). This is in contrast to the view expressed by Bunyatov, *Gyulistan-i Iram* p. 4: "*Gulistan-i Iram* is exactly the first work that promoted the formation of the national self-consciousness of the Azerbaijani people." On this figure see also Audrey L. Altstadt, "*Nasihatlär* (Admonitions) of Abba Kulu Agha Bakikhanli", *Central Asian Monuments*, ed Hasan B. Paksoy (Istanbul, 1992), pp. 105-142. Similarly, it would be difficult to consider the *Firdaws al-iqbäl* and similar works from Central Asia as defining a modern national ideology, see Munis and Agahi, ed. Y. Bregel, *Firdaws al-iqbäl. History of Khorezm* (Leiden, 1988).

as a transnational Islamist movement may also be viewed as a form of proto-nationalism, may be contrasted with the idea of a Turkish nation and other ideologies that emerged later in the Ottoman Empire.⁷³ A third issue is how all these various ideas in the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire may have been related and/or influenced each other in the 19th century.

Märcani, who began his career criticizing scholasticism in Bukhara, followed an intellectual path that led him to write the first national history of the Kazan Tatars. He was admired so greatly by his followers not because of his work as a scholar of Islamic religion, but because of his contributions to the popular idea of a Kazan Tatar nation. After all these issues have been considered, I believe what emerges is an argument for considering Şihabâddin Märcani the first national historian among all the Turkic peoples.

⁷³ On Ottomanism in the 19th century, see Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *19 uncu asır Türk edebiyatı tarihi* (Istanbul, 1976), pp. 152-153; Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton, 1962), especially pp. 326-336; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 323-361; and more recently the works of Şükrü Hanioglu. On Islamism as a proto-nationalism see M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Patterns of Political Islamic Identity: Dynamics of National and Transnational loyalties and identities", *Central Asian Survey* 14:3 (1995), pp. 341-372, especially p. 360. In most regards Turkish national ideology is a later phenomenon that was also informed by thinkers from various Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire, see for example Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism. From Irredentism to Cooperation*, pp. 7-73.