The Formation of a Tatar Historical Consciousness: Şihabäddin Märcani and the Image of the Golden Horde*

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The history of the Kazan Tatar people is usually seen in terms of a complex and sometimes contradictory set of identities: Volga Bulgar, Muslim, Tatar and Kazan Tatar. This chain of identities as the historical tradition of the Kazan Tatars was canonised in the 19th century by Şihabäddin Märcani, the father of modern Kazan Tatar historiography. Since Märcani was the first to present this chain of identities to a Tatar audience in their own language, he must also be considered the father of the modern self-image and national identity of the Kazan Tatars. This chain of identities has a firm grounding in historical fact. Yet, I would like to offer examples to suggest that Märcani’s treatment of the Golden Horde and other periods can also be examined within the context of the manipulation of historical symbols. In fact, a closer examination reveals that the process by which the modern identity of the Kazan Tatars was created was not unique: the creation of a Kazan Tatar national identity conformed to exactly the same paradigm as the creation of national ideologies elsewhere in Europe in the modern period.

To begin, let us briefly review the series of identities upon which Märcani drew and which continue to serve as important symbols today:

1. Volga Bulgar. The Volga Bulgars are the first link in this chain of identities formulated by Märcani. The Volga Bulgarian state came into existence in the 10th century C.E. or possibly earlier at the confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers, within the boundaries of the present-day Tatar ASSR.¹ The towns of this state were important political and mercantile centres, as well as an early home to a Turko-Islamic high culture in the Middle Volga region. Although Volga

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Bulgaria lost its importance as a significant independent political unit following the Mongol conquests in the 13th century, the status of the former Bulgarian state’s territory changed once again upon the fragmentation of the Golden Horde in the late 14th century.

2. Muslim. The Volga Bulgarians were already converts to Islam by the time of Ibn Faḍlān’s visit in the early 10th century. In the centuries following the Russian conquest of the Middle Volga region, the formerly dominant Turkic and Muslim population resisted acculturation to the now-dominant Russian and Orthodox culture. The Islamic religion served as the most important element of social cohesion against the new conquerors. Language was not the most important bond (exclusion of the Christianised Kräšen Tatars is a good example of this), and the earlier processes of linguistic and ethnic transformation among the indigenous peoples continued through the 16th to 19th centuries. It can be argued that the now sub-dominant Muslim Turkic population, including non-Muslim and/or non-Turkic communities which continued to acculturate to the Muslim Turkic community, did not have a shared identity in the modern sense of a “nation”. Islam continues to serve as an important link bridging the mediaeval Volga Bulgarians and the modern Kazan Tatars: in August 1989 the Tatar ASSR held an elaborate international celebration of the 200th anniversary of the establishment of the Religious Board for the Muslims of the European part of Russia and the 1100th Hijri anniversary of the conversion of Volga Bulgaria to Islam. They were in effect celebrating their own conversion of over a millenium ago.

3. Tatar. The name “Tatar” was introduced into the Middle Volga region and the other territories of the Golden Horde with the Mongol conquests. Contemporary sources make it clear that this name came to be used by all the inhabitants of the Golden Horde speaking a variety of languages including Turkic languages, Mongolian, and perhaps other languages. Today many Kazan Tatars are not content with this name because Russian and Soviet historiography continue to identify the Kazan Tatars of today as the direct descendants of the “Tatars”, which in the terminology of these historians means the hated Mongolian-speaking rulers of the armies that conquered mediaeval Russia.

4. Kazan Tatar. In the next period, which I term the “Later Golden Horde” (the period lasting from the creation of numerous smaller successor states in the 15th century until the conquest of the various political units by Russia in the 16th to 18th centuries), the former territory of the Volga Bulgarian state came to form an integral part of the Khanate of Kazan. Following the fall of the Khanate in 1552 as the first foreign conquest of the emerging Russian Empire, elements
of the dynastic and tribal elite of the Khanate of Kazan either fled to other states, were incorporated into the developing Russian aristocracy, or were simply vanquished. The indigenous Muslim Turkic population in and around the city of Kazan was resettled beyond a perimeter extending many kilometres away from the city. The indigenous and newly-resettled population of the surrounding territories (again including the former core territories of the Volga Bulgarian state) would later form the core group of the modern Kazan Tatars. In the 19th century these Muslim Turks of the Middle Volga region came to acquire a shared identity under the name “Kazan Tatar”.

The problems and inconsistencies in this series of identities, described only in the briefest terms, has given rise to a heated nationalistic polemic between modern scholars and ethnic groups arguing different sets of relationships between these and other identities. A troublesome element in the series of identities formulated by Márcani is the fact that the Kazan Tatar language is related most closely to Bashkir, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Noğay, and the other languages of the Kipchak group of the Turkic languages, while the Volga Bulgarian written language is most closely related to the language of the modern Chuvash, which belongs to a completely different classificatory group of the Turkic languages. This is one of the bases for the Chuvash claim to the Volga Bulgarian legacy. Although speakers of Kipchak Turkic languages seem to have been present in the Middle Volga region in the pre-Mongol period, it is only during the Mongol period that Kipchak Turkic languages (including the future Kazan Tatar language) came to predominate in the Middle Volga region. At the same time, the Volga Bulgarian written language disappeared completely in the sixth decade of the 14th century, a century and a half after the Mongol conquests. This break in continuity has been used as an argument against the Chuvash position, nor do the Chuvash show evidence of ever having been Muslim. In hindsight it is clear that forging such a chain of identities for the Kazan Tatars, or any other group, was bound to be problematic. It also serves to demonstrate that the forging of such a chain of identities could not have been anything less than a conscious act.

The story of how the modern Kazan Tatars came to acquire and share this particular chain of identities cannot be separated from the career of Şihabāddin Márcani (1818–1889), one of the leading Kazan Tatar intellectuals of the 19th century. Following his early education in the village madrassa in Taşkıçü, Márcani pursued a traditional Islamic education in Bukhara and Samarkand during the years 1838–1849. He then returned to Kazan to positions in a mosque and
madrassa, and later he was appointed teacher at the Russo-Tatar Teacher’s School. Significantly, while in Kazan he also had frequent contacts with Russian and European scholars and their works. These contacts may have given Märcani the impetus to write a series of works presenting the history of the contemporary Kazan Tatars as a nation. Although Märcani wrote most of his works (including numerous religious treatises, historical essays, and a biographical dictionary) in Arabic, his best-known work is the Müstâfâd ût-axbar fi ahval Qazan vâ Bulğar written in the Kazan Tatar language. This is his classic exposition of the history of Volga Bulğaria, the Golden Horde, the Khanate of Kazan, and the Muslim Turks of the Middle Volga region down to his own time.

The works of Märcani and the later Tatar scholars are quite distinct in character from the earlier indigenous source traditions. The works of these scholars often represented competent historical scholarship for their own time and in many cases retain their scholarly value even today. Nevertheless, these works, and in some cases even the sources which they utilised, continue to remain unknown within the mainstream of modern Western studies devoted to the earlier history of the Middle Volga region. With the passage of time, these works have also taken on an independent value as important documents of Kazan Tatar cultural and intellectual history in the 19th–early 20th centuries. For this reason it is distressing that these works tend to be neglected in Western studies of the intellectual and cultural history of the Kazan Tatars in this period.

Märcani’s oft-cited but little-used Müstâfâd ût-axbar has special significance for a number of reasons. This was the first modern history of the Kazan Tatars, that work which founded and defined the modern study of the history of the Kazan Tatars. The views expressed by Märcani gained a wider audience through the writings of later scholars who followed, whether in agreement or in disagreement, the contours outlined in Märcani’s work. It was also the first modern history of the Kazan Tatars written in the Tatar language. Even decades after the original publication of this work, Märcani’s views continued to be disseminated to an ever-increasing audience through the press. Thus it played a unique role in the formation of the modern Kazan Tatar historical consciousness. The importance of this last point is not to be underestimated.

The Müstâfâd ût-axbar can speak for itself as a work of historical scholarship. Many of the most important Arabic, Persian, Turkic, and numismatic sources for the history of the Golden Horde in this period were well known to Märcani. In fact, in his account of the history of the Golden Horde Märcani utilises Islamic sources that many recent historians of the Golden Horde seem to have ignored in
their own works. Among the various sources on which he relies one can mention Arabic sources such as Ibn ‘Arabšâh, Ibn al-Wardî and Ibn Xaldûn; Persian sources such as Rašîd ad-Dîn and Mîrîxwând; Turkic sources such as the narrative works of Abulğa and the yarḥq of Temür Qutluq from the late 14th century; and coins struck by the rulers of the Golden Horde. All these sources form the basis of his chronology, and he compares and analyses the information found in them. He often quotes the text of the original source and translates it for the benefit of his readers who did not know Arabic; he does not usually translate excerpts from Persian sources. In sum, this was a competent piece of historical writing for its time.  

Yet, despite the impressive array of sources used in Mârcani’s work, this work should also be seen today as a formative work of national history, as was the case with so many other important historical treatises written elsewhere in Europe in the same period. In fact, Mârcani’s work is a crucial element in the creation of a Kazan Tatar national ideology fitting squarely within the framework which has been described by Eric Hobsbawm and others. Hobsbawm argues that both modern and pre-modern political and religious institutions, ideological movements, and other groups adapted, ritualised, and institutionalised existing customary traditional practices; in many cases traditions are simply invented. This is especially true for the unprecedented modern phenomenon of nationalism, for which even historic continuity had to be invented, for example through the creation of an ancient past beyond effective historical continuity through semi-fiction or even forgery. Where traditions are invented, it is often not because old ways are no longer available or viable, but because they are deliberately not used or adapted. Hobsbawm sees three overlapping types of invented traditions of the period since the industrial revolution, which are:

1. those establishing or symbolising social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities;
2. those establishing or legitimising institutions, status or relations of authority; and
3. those whose main purpose was socialisation, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems, and conventions of behaviour.

I would like to offer a few examples from Mârcani’s treatment of the period of the Golden Horde to support my contention that Mârcani should be studied as a writer seeking to establish social cohesion or membership in that community known today as the “Kazan Tatars”.

The first example which one may cite is the use of the name “Tatar” itself. As I have already pointed out, this name was originally not the self-appellation of the Muslim Turks of the Middle Volga region. Before the Mongol conquests they were known as Bulgars, and there
were also Kipchak peoples in this area. The name Tatar, on the other hand, was introduced during the Mongol period, later acquiring a usage in Russian referring to all the various Turkic, Mongol, Uralic, and other peoples of Eurasia; it was probably only in the 19th century that it gained broad acceptance among the Kazan Tatars of today. Mârcani, who vigorously defends the use of this ethnonym, traces continuity in the use of the name Tatar from before the rise of the Mongol world empire in the 13th century until his own time. He describes that this was a name which existed as early as the time of the Türk xaqans for people who were enemies of the Mongols, but that this name later came to be associated with the Mongols. (He actually takes it even further back in time by co-opting the origin myth of the Tatars and Mongols extending back to Japheth, son of Noah.) Mârcani continues that the peoples of the Golden Horde, including the Volga Bulgarians, first came to be known as the progeny of Berke (a mid-13th century khan of the Golden Horde). Later, they came to be known as Uzbek (Ozbek), after the name of the well-known khan of the first half of the 14th century. According to Mârcani, the Volga Bulgarians adopted both these names, but finally abandoned the name Uzbek in favour of the name Tatar. He finds it odd, though, that the descendants of Abulxayr Khan continued to use the name Uzbek in the territories of the former Chağatay Khanate which they had conquered from the north.\textsuperscript{15}

This series of identifications should be understood as Mârcani’s attempt to create a link in the chain of Volga-Bulgarian–Tatar continuity. All of the names which he cites occur in the sources, but it would be impossible to prove this exact sequence of changes in ethnic or political designation taking place in Volga Bulgaria. We can only accept his word that the Volga Bulgarians abandoned the name Bulgar in favour of the name Tatar.\textsuperscript{16} At the same time he is also extending the use of the name Tatar by Turkic peoples to before the Mongol period (perhaps to before historical times). This usage also has a basis in the sources, though it would be difficult to establish exactly who the earlier Tatars were. Finally, Mârcani may also be trying to establish some distance with the Mongol conquerors of Western Eurasia by pointing out that they only acquired the name Tatar later, and that the name Tatar originally did not even refer to Mongols.

Another attempt to establish historical continuity can be seen in Mârcani’s anachronistic usage of toponyms when describing the areas which each of the Tatar khans of the Golden Horde ruled. Mârcani was perfectly aware that the pre-Mongol designation for the territories of the Golden Horde were land of the saqâliba, the Kipchak steppe, and the state of the Bulgars. He also knew that the
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territories of the Golden Horde included the mediaeval lands of Bulğar, Sibir, Burtas, Khwarezm, Kipchak, Rus, Başqurd, Lähistan, Burcan\textsuperscript{17} and Āflaq.\textsuperscript{18} Yet, he also intersperses names known from mediaeval sources with towns founded in the modern period. For example, in describing the territories over which Batu Khan ruled Mārcani includes toponyms such as Tobol, Orenburg, Tambov and Penza.\textsuperscript{19} It seems that such names were intended to instil a sense of historical continuity from the 13th century to the 19th century in the reader’s consciousness, even if such usages were not correct. Another kind of anachronism can be seen in the use of Ottoman Turkish terminology (familiar to Mārcani’s audience) included in the description of earlier Golden Horde officials from whom the Russian dukes sought help. Although Mārcani shows that he is familiar with the Golden Horde titles basqaq and daruğa,\textsuperscript{20} other titles which he uses such as şeyh ül-islam\textsuperscript{21} are not documented for the earlier Golden Horde.

Mārcani further sets up an opposition between the concepts of “Russian” and “Tatar” to unite Tatars together against a common enemy, another technique fitting within Hobsbawm’s framework. Mārcani constantly stresses the theme that during the period of what today we might term the Golden Horde’s domination over Russia, the Russian dukes could not act without the permission of the Tatar khans. He emphasises the Russians’ role as tax-collectors, as well as their cultural and educational backwardness. When Mārcani gives Russian names, they are always represented by the Russian form, meaning that Aleksandr’ is never given as Iskändär, which would be the Tatar equivalent. He will not grant them this symbol of possible identification by a Muslim.\textsuperscript{22}

Islam receives a special emphasis, of course, since hitherto religion had been the most important source of social cohesion among the Kazan Tatars. Briefly, Mārcani praises khans such as Berke and especially Uzbek for supporting the Islamic religion. After the reign of Uzbek, he asserts, any ruler who was not a Muslim was guilty of apostasy (irtidad).\textsuperscript{23} This, again, serves to reinforce continuity, this time in the sphere of religion, from the era of the Volga Bulğarians to the Tatars of the Golden Horde down to his own time. Of course, we can conclude that the Russians who ruled this area after 1552 lacked this particular element of legitimacy.

Mārcani also tries to give explanations for the dearth of historical sources for the period of the Khanate of Kazan (1430s–1552). We can, of course, understand that circumstances such as the campaigns of Tamerlane, the final Russian conquest, and fires in the city of Kazan in later centuries did a great deal of irreparable damage to the literary remains of Volga Bulğaria and the Khanate of Kazan, only a
small fraction of which has survived intact; I have also suggested other factors elsewhere.²⁴ But I would argue that Mârcani compensates for these gaps, in part, through the insertion of an occasional sentence or paragraph which breaks the rhythm of his source-based historical narrative. Such sections are often prefaced (postfaced, actually, in Kazan Tatar) by the phrases “they say”, “it is said”, and so on. I would characterise these insertions as legends, existing or perhaps even created,²⁵ which he is using to bolster his argument. I am not referring to the origin myths which are widely distributed in mediaeval chronicles, but to Mârcani’s statements regarding, for example, the building of the city of Kazan. In one place he says, referring to Sartaq Khan: Kazan şâhärinâ uşbu Sartaq xan bina kildi degân söz bar “it is said that this very Sartaq Khan built the city of Kazan”.²⁶ Elsewhere, he claims that “they say that” one Kazan Khan built the city of Kazan, and he lists a series of figures who could possibly be identified with this legend.²⁷ We might regard all of these identifications as unlikely, in part because of obvious chronological difficulties. Since there is no evidence that Kazan existed as a separate city in this early period,²⁸ we may also understand these references as an attempt to establish a direct link between the Golden Horde of the 13th–14th centuries and the later Khanate of Kazan.

These examples and others can be seen as evidence for considering Mârcani’s work within Hobsbawm’s framework. Mârcani was a serious scholar offering his audience excerpts and interpretations of sources resulting in real historical scholarship, but he was also consciously involved in the creation of an ideology of national identity. The devices which he utilises are subtle: he argues a continuity in nomenclature which may not have been a part of the historical consciousness of his audience and whose reasoning a modern historian might find questionable. He displays a common symbol against which the people should unite, namely the Russians. He introduces a positive symbol of continuity and unity, namely Islam. Finally, he introduces legend as the stuff of historians.

Hobsbawm notes that “the study of invented tradition throws considerable light on the human relation to the past, and therefore the historian’s own subject and craft, for all invented traditions, so far as possible, use history as the legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion”.²⁹ All historians are engaged in this process through their own contributions to the dismantling and restructuring of images of the past. This is especially true of national historiography, since in most regions the concept of the territorial state was a new concept in the late 19th century. Even so, there is the paradox that modern nations claim to be antique.³⁰ As Hobsbawm shows, the need to create such a chain of identities itself serves to prove that there
already existed a break in continuity with the past.\textsuperscript{31}

Märkan's work served the same purpose as the national histories written elsewhere in Europe in the modern period. Thus, in the 19th century, Russia's emerging nations were creating historical traditions under circumstances sometimes strikingly similar to those in Western Europe, such as the oppression of national minorities, except that it is only now that these works are recognised as falling into such a category. For too long it has not been considered that Russian (and Soviet) national history was also formed by the very same process.\textsuperscript{32} Once we realise this, however, we also realise that these very same 19th-century conceptions are still at the heart of modern historical scholarship on the history of all the Muslim and/or Turkic nationalities of the Middle Volga region, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. It becomes apparent that the views first found in the works of Märkan have been adopted \textit{in toto} into modern studies of the origins and history of the Kazan Tatars. The belief in a Volga Bulgar–Golden Horde–Kazan Tatar continuity is a virtual pillar of faith for politicians and scholars alike. What is more, just as Hobsbawm notes that the works of these historians can become part of the common fund of historical knowledge of the people,\textsuperscript{33} I would argue, based on my own observations, that various themes stressed by Märkan, such as internal discord as a leading cause for the downfall of ancestral states such as the Khanate of Kazan,\textsuperscript{34} have become a part of the common historical consciousness of ordinary Kazan Tatars. These are the important legacies of Märkan of which present-day historians should be conscious themselves, unless, of course, they wish to continue this 19th-century tradition of nationalistic history. For those who do not, I think one can overcome these preconceived notions and study the history of the Kazan Tatars and the Middle Volga region anew with methods common to the historical profession today.

\textit{Note on transliteration} — The correct and consistent transcription of transliteration of 19th-century Kazan Tatar written in Arabic script presents a bit of a challenge. The literary language of the period evolved from the orthographic system of Chagatai, yet it also shows heavy Ottoman Turkish influence. To complicate matters further, the vocalic system of Kazan Tatar (and Bashkir) diverges from the vocalic system of the better-known Standard Turkic languages as represented by Turkish, and the spelling of certain words (such as \textit{ni} “what?”) indicates that some or all words were written to reflect Kazan Tatar pronunciation. Since the reader is most likely to be familiar with Standard Turkic pronunciation, I first give that form followed by the corresponding pronunciation in Kazan Tatar. (I have not felt it necessary to refer to the modern Cyrillic orthographic representation of Arabic-script Kazan Tatar, since this would diverge from any accepted Western system.)
NOTES


2. See the reference in Faxrutdinov, Ocherki po istorii Volzhskoi Bulgārii, pp. 166–172; and Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, pp. 4–5.

3. See Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, pp. 4 and 8. In the Tatar ASSR in recent times there has even been a movement calling upon Tatars to change their name to Bulgār. See my “The Tatar Public Center and Current Tatar Concerns”, Report on the USSR Vol. 1, 22 December, 1989, No. 51, pp. 11–15.


7. On the significance of this, see my article entitled “The End of Volga Bulgarian” to appear in the Rōna-Tas Festschrift.


9. Kazan Tatar: Mūşāfād el-āxbar fi āxval Kazan və Bolgar, i–ii, Kazan: 1885–1900. I have been able to consult only the second edition of this work, which was published in 1897–1900. It is my understanding that there is no difference between the first and second editions. The New York Public Library now has a master negative microfilm of the two volumes of the second edition from which copies can be ordered. The recent condensed version of this work in modern Kazan Tatar already cited [Mūşāfāda el-āxbar fi āxval Kazan və Bolgar, A. N. Xäyrullin (ed.)] does not include the sections devoted to the history of the Golden Horde.

10. It is curious that scholars who are not able to consult Mărcani, or other important writers, find it possible to devalue the contents of their works: see for example A. Kappeler, Russlands erste Nationalitäten. Das Zarenreich und die Völker der Mittleren Wolga vom 16. bis 19. Jahrhundert, Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas 14, Cologne: 1982, p. 13. An example of an outstanding historical work written in Arabic by a later Tatar scholar is the Talfiq al-āxbār wa-talqīḥ al-āṭār fi waqā‘i‘ Qazān wa-Bulğār wa-mulāk at-Tatār of M.M. Râmzi,
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The use of a word that is virtually unknown today, was found
useful by B. Spuler in his *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland, 1223-
1502*, Wiesbaden: 1965^2. On this scholar see A. Temir, “Doğumunun 130. ve
ölümunun 50 yıldan dolayısiyla Kazanlı tarihçi Murad Remzi (1854–1934)”,
*Belleten* Vol. 50, August 1986, No. 197, pp. 495–505 + plate.

11. See the volume entitled *Inventing Traditions*, E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger
(eds), Cambridge: 1983. The two important essays by Hobsbawm in this volume
are “Introduction”, pp. 1–14; and “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870–


16. There was also a 16th-century Muscovite theory of continuity from Volga
Bulgaria to the Khanate of Kazan. This theory, however, was formulated for

17. On this name as referring to Danubian Bulgaria see P. Pelliot, *Notes sur
l’histoire de la Horde d’Or, suivi de quelques noms turcs d’hommes et de peuples


24. See for example “The End of Volga Bulgarian.”

25. I have yet to examine collections of Tatar folklore in order to clarify this matter
further.

26. Kazan Tatar: *Kazan şähärenä oșbu Sartaq xan bina kıldı digän süz bar, Miştəfad
əl-axbar*, p. 97.

27. *Miştəfad əl-axbar*, p. 100. See also p. 105.

28. See A.X. Xaliko, “O vremeni, meste vozniknoveniia i nazvanii goroda
Kazani”, *Iz istorii kul’tury i byta tatarskogo naroda i ego predkov*, Kazan: 1976,
pp. 3–19; and the discussion of the study of old Kazan and present-day Kazan in


32. A useful collection of essays devoted to just this problem has been published in
*Russian History/Histoire Russe* Vol. 13, Winter 1986, No. 4: G.M. Enteen,
“Historiography and Nationalism”, pp. 309–311; R. Byrnes, “Kliuchevskii on
the Multi-National Russian State”, pp. 313–330; S. Becker, “Contributions to a
Nationalist Ideology: Histories of Russia in the First Half of the Nineteenth
Century”, pp. 331–353 (highly recommended for a discussion of a series of
points comparable to what I have described for Märcani); C.W. Reddel “S.M.
Solov’ev and Multi-National History”, pp. 355–366; and E.C. Thaden, “V.N.
Tatishchev, German Historians, and the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences,”
pp. 367–398.
